The decision to approve or even consider a development agreement is left to the good judgment and discretion of the elected local board of directors. This decision is a legislative decision, as is the decision to readjust land.  . G.S. 153A-349.6 (d); 160A-400.25 (d). One of the readings of G.S. 153A-349.1 (b) and 160A-400.20 (b) is that they limit the types of taxes and royalties that can be imposed on the beneficiaries of the law, but remain silent on negotiated cost-sharing agreements. . In nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374 (1994), the U.S. Supreme Court found that regulatory claims are constitutionally limited to those that are reasonably related to the effects of development and are roughly proportional to those effects. However, the Court of Justice in Lingle/Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) found that these constitutional restrictions applied only to land-use projects that would not affect development agreements.  The decision of declaration G.S. 1-253 to -267 is the appropriate means to challenge the constitutionality, validity or establishment of regulations. Since the decision to adopt a development agreement is made by regulation, this would be the means of questioning the constitutionality or validity of an agreement. This must be distinguished from the interpretation of contractual terms (which is not a regulation). . G.S.
153A-322 (d) and 160A-363 (d) expressly allow municipalities and cities to adopt procedures and establish legally authorized organizational structures for all aspects of their development rules. Development agreements only concern administrative development authorisation and cannot, in themselves, influence the competence of a local government. A development agreement can only be accepted by a local government responsible for the area affected by the agreement. Cities can adopt development agreements within their borders and extraterritorial territories; Counties can do this in non-communal areas outside the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the city. . G.S. 153A-349.6 (b); 160A-400.25 (b). Failure to meet a start or completion date cannot in itself be considered a substantial violation of the agreement. Such an omission must be assessed in “all circumstances” to determine whether it is an offence.  Although the statutes of the development agreement do not contain a specific conflict of interest standard, it is likely that the same general standard would apply to boards of directors and advisory boards for legislative area decisions.
G.S. 153A-340 (g), 160A-381 (d).  In Bollech v. Charles County, 69 F. App`x 178, 181 (4. Cir. 2003), the Tribunal found that the developer`s failure to construct the authorized development and install the necessary improvements to the supply up to the period set out in the development agreement freed the county from any enforceable contractual obligation. In Leon County vs.
Gluesenkamp, 873 So. 2d 460 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), the Tribunal found that Landkreis` refusal to grant building permits under a development contract was not an offence if a court order had ordered a moratorium on such permits. Local regulations that came into force at the time of the agreement remain in force for the duration of the agreement, with some exceptions. One of the exceptions is the ability to apply local regulations and regulatory amendments subsequently adopted for the same reasons that apply to the authorized modification of local and phased planning plans.  There are three types of amendments that can support such an amendment to the local regulation control rule to the time control agreement. First, changes that have the authority of the landowner or that make the landowner financially sound. The agreement of the landowner must be written and, for the compensation option, the owner of the land must be compensated for the full cost of modification (excluding impairments).